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BUSINESS-DIVORCE DISTRIBUTION:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS
DISENTANGLEMENT OF A JOINTLY OWNED CLOSE
CORPORATION INVOLVED IN A DIVORCE ACTION
Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 568 N.W.2d 728
I.

FACTS

Gene and Sheila Fisher were married in 1968.1 Gene Fisher
brought real estate and interests in several businesses to their marriage,
while Sheila Fisher brought no major assets to the marriage. 2 One of
Gene's premarital interests was one-fourth of a family-owned business,
Fisher Sand & Gravel. 3 After the couple married, Gene inherited his
father's one-fourth interest in the company, and Gene and Sheila then
purchased the remaining two-fourths interests, giving them full control
of Fisher Sand & Gravel. 4 Once they had full control of Fisher Sand &
Gravel, Gene began gifting stock to Sheila and their children for tax
planning purposes. 5 In 1983, Gene gave controlling stock to Sheila for
the purpose of gaining contracting preferences for minority-owned
businesses. 6
Gene predominantly ran Fisher Sand & Gravel until June 1992, with
Sheila becoming more involved as the years passed. 7 Ultimately, Sheila
took control of the company in 1992 by having herself and two directors elected to the five-member board. 8 At this point, Gene sued for
divorce, but the couple was able to reconcile. 9 By December 1992, Gene
1. Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 1 2, 568 N.W.2d 728, 729.
2. Fisher, 2, 568 N.W.2d at 729. Gene claimed that he brought $1,910,000 worth of assets to
the marriage. Brief for Appellee at 4-5, Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 568 N.W.2d 728 (No.
960211). Sheila disputed this amount, claiming that Gene's premarital assets were only worth
$291,500. id. at 6. Sheila stated that the only evidence submitted by Gene to prove his premarital
worth consisted of his own testimony regarding the property's value. Brief for Appellant at 4, Fisher
v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 568 N.W.2d 728 (No. 960211).
3. Fisher, 2, 568 N.W.2d at 729.
4. Brief for Appellant at 4, Fisher (No. 960211). The total purchase price for the remaining
stock interest was $160,000; this amount was split between Gene's two brothers, who were in control
of the other half of Fisher Sand & Gravel. Id.
5. Fisher, 1 3. 568 N.W.2d at 729.
6. Id. Gene claimed that the company only briefly benefited from the minority certification.
Brief for the Appellee at 8, Fisher (No. 960211). The company later lost the certification because it
exceeded allowable sales. Id. at 8-9. At that point, Gene asked Sheila to return the controlling interest
in Fisher Sand & Gravel. Id. at 9. Sheila refused to agree to this and maintained the controlling
interest in the corporation. Id.
7. Fisher, 1 4, 568 N.W.2d at 729.
8. Id.
9. Id. Before the reconciliation occurred, Gene seized control of the company for a brief period
through an Ex Parte Interim Order. Brief for the Appellee at 9, Fisher (No. 960211). Once the
couple reconciled, the Ex Parte Interim Order was dismissed, leaving Sheila in control of Fisher Sand
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was removed from the company presidency and was demoted to the
position of field consultant for Fisher Sand & Gravel. 10
Gene sued for divorce again in 1994, seeking an equitable division
of the couple's property, their major marital asset being the combined
business entity known as Fisher Industries. 11 Before trial, the court issued an Amended Interim and Extended Temporary Protection Order. 12
This order gave Sheila protection from Gene by prohibiting him from
coming within 150 feet of her. 13 The court also ordered Gene to refrain
from communicating with company employees and gave Sheila use of
the family home. 14 The couple stipulated to Sheila's adultery and
Gene's spousal abuse at the trial,15 which prevented evidence of the
party's relationship and the physical violence involved from being used
16
at trial.
Gene and Sheila both testified to the value of property that Gene
brought into the marriage.1 7 The trial court accepted Gene's premarital
property figures, and it therefore awarded him a $500,000 credit against
divided assets.1 8 Sheila and Gene each separately claimed to be responsible for the great success of the business entity known as Fisher Industries, which was valued at $21,600,000.19 Therefore, both Gene and
& Gravel. Id.
10. Fisher, 4, 568 N.W.2d at 729. Gene claimed that the demotion came in 1992, shortly after
the couple had reconciled, since Sheila had maintained control of the company because of their
reconciliation. Brief for Appellee at 9, Fisher(No. 960211).
11. Fisher, U 5-6, 568 N.W.2d at 729. Fisher Industries is the trade name for three businesses,
including Fisher Sand & Gravel and its subsidiaries, General Steel and Supply Company and Green
Acres Farm. Id. 16.
12. Id. 7. The protection order was issued pursuant to repeated physical and mental abuse
claimed and documented by Sheila Fisher, much of which was not allowed in as evidence due to
Gene's stipulation to this fact. Brief for Appellant at 8-10, Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 568
N.W.2d 728 (No. 960211).
13. Fisher, 7, 568 N.W.2d at 729.
14. Id.
15. Id. 18.
16. Brief for Appellant at 8, Fisher(No. 960211). Sheila was allowed to admit small portions of
police reports and medical records of treatments she received for recent incidents of physical abuse
that took place during the marriage. Id. Sheila also claimed that had she been aware of the lower
court's decision to keep the couple as joint owners, the evidence would have been relevant to show
the deterioration of the marriage to the point that joint ownership would not be practical. Id.
17. Fisher, 8, 568 N.W.2d at 729-30. The couple disputed the actual amount of property that
was premarital; Gene claimed the valuation was $1.91 million, while Sheila asserted his assets were
worth only $291,500. Brief for Appellee at 4-6, Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 568 N.W.2d 728 (No.
960211). Sheila backed up the valuation with an example of over-valued property, arguing that while
Gene claimed that his one-fourth interest in Fisher Sand & Gravel was worth $200,000, the couple had
purchased two other equal-sized shares from Gene's brothers for $80,000 each. Brief for Appellant
at 5, Fisher(No. 960211).
18. Fisher,1 10, 568 N.W.2d at 730. The premarital credit award was based on Gene's testimony that he owned $1.91 million worth of property prior to the couple's marriage. Brief for Appellee at 4-5. Fisher(No. 960211). The court also awarded Sheila $1,000 in attorney fees for Gene's
violation of the protection order. Fisher,1 10, 568 N.W.2d at 730.
19. Id. 8, 9. The valuation of the company at $21.6 million was for the purpose of an Employee
Stock Option Plan proposed by Sheila. Brief for Appellant at 7, Fisher (No. 960211). However,
Sheila claimed that an outright sale of Fisher Industries would have brought closer to $37.9 million. Id.
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Sheila made proposals to the court for the distribution of Fisher Indus20
tries interests, each in his or her own favor.
Sheila's proposal was in the form of an employee stock option plan
by which the company would purchase Gene's shares. 2 1 As part of
Sheila's plan, Gene would also have to agree to a covenant not to
compete. 22 Gene had two proposals, the first being that he would buy
Sheila's shares at a discounted price, based on her alleged economic
fault, and would pay some of the price over time. 2 3 The second was to
have the court award Gene majority control, for which he could arrange
immediate funding of an equalizing payment of five million dollars to
Sheila. 2 4 The court rejected all of the proposals as presented, but it
accepted Gene's division of the stock, which gave him 1,212 shares and
Sheila 869 shares, leaving the couple in joint ownership of the
business. 25 However, since the distribution of stock was not equal, the
trial court ordered an initial cash payment to Sheila from Gene of
$2,365,070.34 within ninety days in order to balance the split of the
marital estate. 26
Sheila made a motion to have the trial court reconsider its decision,
but the court denied the motion and entered a decree. 2 7 Sheila then
appealed, moved for a stay, and sought $250,000 per year in spousal
support during the appeal. 28 Gene resisted and counter-moved to stay
the court-ordered cash payment of $2,365,070.34 during the time of the
appeal. 29 The court stayed the cash payment and ordered Gene to pay
30
$20,000 monthly to Sheila for spousal support during the appeal.
Sheila appealed, contesting the trial court's stock split, asserting that
because of the couple's mutual animosity and Gene's abuse there was
at 8.
20. Fisher,1 9, 568 N.W.2d at 730.
21. Id. The plan would have allowed the company to purchase Gene's stock without having to incur additional debt. Brief for Appellant at 14, Fisher(No. 960211). The plan also would have resulted in a tax-free purchase of all shareholders' stock and would have kept the business operating in the
family by leaving Sheila and the children in charge. Id. at 15. Sheila's agreement on the stipulated
value of $21.6 million depended on this plan; otherwise, she argued that the valuation of $37.9 million
was appropriate. Id.
22. Fisher, 9, 568 N.W.2d at 730.
23. Id. Gene's claim of economic fault arose because of unwarranted expenditures he argued
Sheila made with Fisher Industries money, including paying for consultant and attorney fees as well as
lavish spending on herself and others. Brief for Appellee at 15, Fisher (No. 960211).
24. Fisher, 9, 568 N.W.2d at 730. The second plan was in response to the court's warning that
it would not rule in favor of Gene on the economic fault issue. Brief for Appellant at 14, Fisher(No.
960211).
25. Fisher,1 11, 568 N.W.2d at 730. The split of stock in this manner left Gene in control of
51% of Fisher Industries and put Sheila in a minority stockholder position with only a 37% interest. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. 12.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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no way they could continue to remain in business together. 3 1 Sheila
claimed that since her buy-out plan was not accepted, all of the stock
should have gone to Gene and she should have been awarded offsetting
payments. 32 Sheila also argued that as a minority stockholder, her
corporate remedies were inadequate to protect her interest. 33 Sheila's
final contention on appeal was that if the stock was correctly split, the
value of her shares should have been discounted and the cash payment
to her increased accordingly to accomplish an equal division. 34
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's premarital property credit and stock valuation without discount, but it reversed
and remanded the decision to split the corporation stock between Gene
and Sheila Fisher. 35 The court held that, on remand, joint ownership of
the corporation should be severed, but that an equal division of the
36
marital property should still be maintained.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

RUFF-FSCHER GUIDELINES FOR PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION AND
ALLOWANCE OF PREMARITAL PROPERTY CREDIT

The subject of divorce in North Dakota, including the allowable
causes of divorce, is covered in North Dakota Century Code Chapter
14-05. 37 According to this chapter, if there is no agreement between the
parties on how to divide the marital property at divorce, the court retains
the power to make a division. This rule is found in section 14-05-24,
which states that "the court shall make such equitable distribution of
the real and personal property of the parties as may seem just and proper
. . . having regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively." 38
31. Id. 13.
32. Id. Sheila believed that without distribution in this manner, Gene had exclusive use of her
only income-producing asset. Id. Sheila's position was that as a minority stockholder she had no voice
or share in corporate income. Id.
33. Id. Sheila argued that Gene could sidestep the corporate remedies available to her as a
minority stockholder if Gene used the broad powers of the corporation. Id. If the powers were thus
infringed, Sheila argued, she would be required to commence further litigation, possibly in the form of
a corporate dissolution, which the trial court could more easily address as part of the original divorce
proceeding. Brief for Appellant at 25-26, Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 568 N.W.2d 728 (No.
969211).
34. Fisher,1 13, 568 N.W.2d at 730.
35. Id, 36, 568 N.W.2d at 735.
36. Id.
37. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-05-01 to -26 (1997). For the purposes of Gene and Sheila Fisher's
divorce, the court entered a decree of irreconcilable differences. See Fisher, 1 10, 568 N.W.2d at
730; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-03(8) (1997) (listing irreconcilable differences as one of the
eight allowable causes of divorce in North Dakota). Irreconcilable differences are defined as
grounds by which a court determines there are substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and,
therefore, the marriage should be dissolved. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-09.1 (1997).
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1997).
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Once the trial court has made distribution of the marital property, the
decision will not be overturned on appeal unless it is shown to be unfair
39
and inequitable in relation to the facts of each particular case.
In Ruff v. Ruff4O and Fischer v. Fischer,4 1 the North Dakota
Supreme Court adopted guidelines for the trial courts to follow when
42
making a distribution of property upon the dissolution of a marriage.
According to the guidelines, the distribution of property does not necessarily have to be equal, but it must be equitable under the circumstances
of each particular case.4 3 To achieve this end, the court listed a series of
44
factors to be considered in making an equitable division of property.
This list, which has become known as the Ruff-Fischer guidelines,
includes,
the respective ages of the parties . . . their earning ability; the
duration of and the conduct of each during the marriage; their
station in life; the circumstances and necessities of each; their
health and physical condition; their financial circumstances as
shown by the property owned . . . its value . . . its
income-producing capacity, if any, and whether accumulated
45
or acquired before or after the marriage.
These factors were affirmed by later decisions, establishing them as the
46
framework around which a divorce property distribution takes place.
One of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines is whether the property in question was acquired before or after the marriage. 4 7 Generally, the court
has determined that individual assets must remain part of the marital estate for the purposes of determining an equitable division. 4 8 Once these
39. Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845, 850 (N.D. 1966).
40. 52 N.W.2d 107 (N.D. 1952).
41. 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D. 1966).
42. See Ruff v. Ruff, 52 N.W.2d 107, 111 (N.D. 1952) (adopting Nebraska law from Holmes v.
Holmes, 41 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Neb. 1950)); see also Agrest v. Agrest, 27 N.W.2d 697, 703 (N.D.
1947) (stating similar circumstances as those adopted from Nebraska in Ruff without giving authority
for their origin).
43. Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845, 849 (N.D. 1966).
44. See Ruff, 52 N.W.2d at 111.
45. See id.; see also Fischer, 139 N.W.2d at 852 (citing both Ruff, 52 N.W.2d at 111, and Holmes,
41 N.w.2d at 921).
46. See Fischer, 139 N.W.2d at 852-53 (citing Fleck v. Fleck, 58 N.W.2d 765, 772 (N.D. 1953)).
Courts continually followed the Ruff and Fischer cases, and the test drawn from them has become
known as the Ruff-Fischerguidelines. Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 1 10, 568 N.w.2d 728, 730.
47. See Fischer, 139 N.W.2d at 852; see also Fraase v. Fraase, 315 N.W.2d 271, 273-74 (N.D.
1982).
48. Heley v. Heley, 506 N.W.2d 715, 718 (N.D. 1993) (citing Gronneberg v. Gronneberg, 412
N.W.2d 84, 92 (N.D. 1987)); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 368 N.W.2d 566, 568 (N.D. 1985);
Fraase,315 N.W.2d at 274; Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 44 (N.D. 1977); Fine v. Fine, 248
N.W.2d 838, 841 (N.D. 1977).
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assets are figured into the marital estate, the court can then go forward in
49
applying the Ruff-Fischer guidelines for making a property division.
Once the court has applied the guidelines, it can decide to shift the
division one way or the other depending on the amount of property or
gifts a spouse acquired prior to the marriage. 5 0 The North Dakota
Supreme Court has allowed for a premarital property credit by noting
that when "property subject to distribution was acquired ...prior to the
marriage [it] is a consideration weighing in favor of that party, but it
does not prevent the court from awarding part or all of the property to
the other party should an equitable distribution require it."51 Determining pre-marital property credits and property distributions thus ultimately lies in the court's discretion. 5 2 The court also applies these principles
of equitable distribution when it distributes corporate property owned
jointly by divorcing spouses. 5 3 Such a distribution also raises other
issues, however, including the problem of leaving a recently divorced
couple in joint control of a business.
B.

MINORITY STOCKHOLDER POSITION AND THE TREATMENT OF
CORPORATIONS UNDER THE

BUSINESS

CORPORATION

ACT

The North Dakota Supreme Court in Fisher gave consideration to
the problem of continued joint ownership of a corporation by a divorced
couple, and it recognized that the "at-odds-with-the-majority" minority
shareholder in a closely held corporation is subject to the power of the
majority. 54
This issue is not unique to divorce situations, and a substantial body
of law has developed to deal with it. As a general matter, when a disagreement arose in the corporate setting, early American courts tended
to follow the business judgment rule, which presumed that the actions of
the directors and officers of a corporation were done in good faith and
therefore were not questioned by the court. 55 Judicial deference has not
49. See Gualrapp v. Gualrapp, 510 N.W.2d 620, 621 (N.D. 1994) (citing Freed v. Freed, 454
N.W.2d 516, 520 (N.D. 1990)).
50. VanOosting v. VanOosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 99 (N.D. 1994); see also Laura R. Ellis, Note,
Divorce, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1027, 1029 (1995) (commenting on the North Dakota case of
Van~osting v. Van~osting and the inclusion of non-marital property in determining an equitable
distribution).
51. Fraase, 315 N.W.2d at 274 (citing Fine, 248 N.W.2d at 841). The trial court in Fraase had
allowed Mark Fraase approximately $215,000 more of a distribution due the fact that he owned
farmland and a lake lot prior to the marriage. Id.
52. Id.
53. See generally Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 1 10, 568 N.W.2d 728, 730 (discussing the
Ruff-Fischer guidelines and their implementation in relation to Gene and Sheila's combined interest in
Fisher Industries stock).
54. See id.
55. Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remaedies for Minority Shareholders and Its
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remained so broad, however, and courts do not always recognize a director's decisionmaking as the final word. 56 This holds true particularly for

relationships among shareholders of closely held corporations, in which
courts have imposed standards of fiduciary duty among the shareholders. 57 In a closely held corporation, a small number of people hold a
majority of the stock, and the stockholders are usually well acquainted
with one another and with each other's business techniques.S8 In most
cases, the shareholders are also usually active in the business, often
serving as key participants. 59
However, for a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation, it
is not always guaranteed that what is good for the corporation through
the eyes of the majority shareholder or shareholders is equally good for
the minority shareholder. 6 0 Due to the close relationship of the parties
and the view that no "prudent person" would purchase minority shares
in a corporation suffering from dissension, there is no established market
for shareholders to sell their stock when and if they need to do so. 6 1
This limited market and other problems have caused the North Dakota
Supreme Court, as well as many others, to recognize that a minority
stockholder may be subject to oppressive tactics by a majority stockholder when a dispute arises between the parties. 62 Therefore, courts
Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 425, 429 (1990). Murdock cites
early New York and Illinois case law for the proposition that courts will refrain from interfering with
corporate disputes whenever possible. See id. at 429 (citing Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 32
N.E. 420, 423 (11. 1892); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 100 N.E. 721, 723-24 (N.Y. 1912)).
56. See id. at 431 (discussing the "duty of care/duty of loyalty" dichotomy).
57. See HARRY G. HEN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORAnONS § 268 (3d ed. 1983). By
describing the duty of directors towards shareholders through the term "unfairly prejudicial," the
Business Corporation Act in North Dakota has imposed what can be considered a fiduciary duty upon
directors. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(l)(b)(3) (1985 & Supp. 1997). This duty requires that
the shareholders and directors of a closely held corporation act in an "honest, fair, and reasonable
manner in the operation of the corporation." N.D. CErT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(4) (1985 & Supp. 1997).
Therefore, the court is free to look at these actions in determining whether or not to allow dissolution
of the corporation or to allow for other less drastic measures. Id.
58. See Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987) (stating that one of the characteristics of a close corporation is that the shareholders are limited in number, usually to one or two); see
also N.D. CEN'. CODE § 10-19.1-01(8) (1985 & Supp. 1997) (defining a closely held corporation as
one in which there are not more than 35 shareholders). For the purposes of Gene and Sheila's case,
the stock control prior to the divorce included Sheila holding 1,391 shares and Gene holding 690
shares, for a total of 88% of the corporation's total stock. See Fisher v. Fisher, 546 N.W.2d 354, 355
(N.D. 1996). This information, however, was from an earlier case in which Gene and Sheila's
children attempted to intervene in the divorce to stop the court-appointed receiver from taking over
the company. Id.
59. See Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 386.
60. See Murdock, supra note 55, at 431.
61. See Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 386; see also Murdock, supra note 55, at 425 (discussing the
likelihood of a person purchasing shares from a minority shareholder in conflict with the majority).
62. See Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 386; see also Murdock, supra note 55, at 455-61 (setting out the
history of court-recognized oppression). Illinois was the first state to recognize the concept of oppression by majority stockholders over minority stockholders, which it did in its adoption of the Business
Corporation Act of 1933. Murdock, supra note 55, at 455.
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have imposed a fiduciary responsibility toward minority stockholders on
the part of majority stockholders. 63
1.

"Freeze-out" Tactics and Court Valuation of Stock With or
Without the Effects of a Minority Discount

The oppressive tactics of a majority stockholder towards a minority
stockholder have come to be known as a "freeze-out." 64 A freeze-out
has the effect of depriving the minority shareholder of the economic
benefit the shareholder received from being part of the corporation, such
as salary or dividend payments, which in some instances may be the
shareholder's sole income. 6 5 The difficulty with freeze-out tactics is in
determining whether a court would rely on the business judgment rule in
an attempt to allow the business to function on its own accord. 6 6 The
other option is to look to the majority stockholders as having a fiduciary
duty to the minority, a duty which would force them to refrain from
employing freeze-out tactics. 67
In relation to these two theories, most courts see the remedy of
judicial dissolution of a corporation as an extreme measure that has the
effect of disadvantaging all interests in the corporation. 6 8 However, the
advent of alternative remedies to dissolution has given the court other
options, including the permanent solution of a court-ordered buy-out of
the minority shares. 69 However, a major problem for the court is determining whether the price the minority will receive in a buy-out will be
fair. 70 This leads to the question of whether a discount should be
applied to the value of the minority shareholder's stock for the .purpose
of determining the fair value the majority or other purchaser will have to
63. See Murdock, supra note 55, at 433 (citing HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 57, § 240, at 653).
64. See Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 386; see also Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 797
(N.D. 1991). A variety of freeze-out techniques exist, including withholding dividends, discharge
from employment, and removal from the board of directors. See D. Charles McDonald, CorporateBehavior and the Minority Shareholder: ContrastingInterpretationsof Section 10-19.1-115 of the North
Dakota Century Code, 62 N.D. L. REV. 155, 164-65 (1986).
65. McDonald, supra note 64, at 165.
66. Murdock, supra note 55, at 427.
67. Murdock, supra note 55, at 427.
68. Murdock, supra note 55, at 427-28.
69. Murdock, supra note 55, at 428. There are three types of alternative remedies to dissolution:
1) judicial action through an injunction in which the court might mandate a declaration of dividends; 2)
appointment of a director or custodian for the corporation; or 3) a judicially ordered buy-out of
minority shares, which must be accomplished by valuing the shares at a "fair price." Murdock, supra
note 55, at 427-28.
70. Murdock, supra note 55, at 428. Murdock notes that majority and minority shareholders have
very different views as to what is a fair price for minority stock. Murdock, supra note 55, at 428. One
of the examples Murdock uses to illustrate this concept is the use of excessive salaries by majority
stockholders. Murdock, supra note 55, at 428. If the majority is taking excessive salaries, the earnings
of the corporation will be reduced, affecting the total value used to determine the fair price for the
minority stockholders' shares. Murdock, supra note 55, at 428.
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pay, either in absence of a buy-out agreement or in spite of one. 7 1 To
value a minority interest stock with a discount means that the majority or
purchasing party would have to pay the minority stockholder less than
72
he or she would otherwise pay.
North Dakota law on the application of a minority discount prior to
Fisher has varied. 73 In 1971, the North Dakota Supreme Court heard
Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 74 the first North Dakota case dealing
with the valuation of shares. 75 A minority shareholder of Q B & R
dissented to a merger with Hedahl's, Inc. after Hedahl's had obtained
fifty-one percent of the Q B & R stock. 76 Quanrud, the minority shareholder, and Hedahl's could not agree on the value of the minority shares
and called upon the court to determine the method of valuation. 7 7 The
court found that there were primarily three types of valuation used by
courts to determine the fair value of stock.78 After application of each
of the three different valuation methods, the asset, market, and earnings
methods, the court determined that it could arrive at a "fair value" of
the stock by taking a fixed percentage of each. 79
In 1989, the court in KBM, Inc. v. MacKichan affirmed this type of
valuation 8 0 by refusing to accept the plaintiffs value of the stock with a
thirty-three percent minority discount, and applying instead a fixed
"fair value" standard. 8 ' KBM was a closely held corporation in which
MacKichan was an employee and stockholder; he resigned employment
71. Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(3)(a) (1985 & Supp. 1997) (stating the court
should follow the agreement but leaving the issue of fair value to the discretion of the court if it
determines that the price terms set forth in any agreement made by the shareholders are
unreasonable).
72. Murdock, supra note 55, at 478-79. This concept is predicated on two theories, the first being
that the value of the minority stock is less because it is not a controlling interest in the corporation.
Murdock, supra note 55, at 478. The second theory is based on the view that closely held corporation
stock is not marketable and is therefore worthless. Murdock, supra note 55, at 479.
73. See generally Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 1 21, 568 N.W.2d 728, 732 (discussing briefly
the minority discount application in North Dakota).
74. 185 N.W.2d 249 (N.D. 1971).
75. See Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249, 258 (N.D. 1971) (finding the issue
of stock value to be one of first impression in North Dakota, which required the court to look to
Delaware law for guidance).
76. See id. at 251-52.
77. See id. at 252.
78. Id. at 254. The court outlined a discussion of the three methods; the market value method, the
asset value method, and the investment or earnings value method. Id. The market value method
establishes value based on the price at which the stock was currently selling or for which it could be
sold. Id. The asset method looks to the net assets of the corporation as a going concern and values
shares by a pro rata share of the total value of the net assets. Id. The earnings method involves an
attempt to predict the future income of the corporation based on previous earnings records and makes
a valuation of stock based on these predictions. Id.
79. See id. at 259.
80. 438 N.W.2d 181 (N.D. 1989).
81. See KBM, Inc. v. MacKichan, 438 N.W.2d 181, 183 (N.D. 1989) (accepting the plaintiff's
valuation without the use of a minority discount but giving no reasoning for its refusal to do so).
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from the corporation but refused to sell his stock after KBM declined his
first offer. 82 After MacKichan declined to sell, KBM sued, requesting
the court to order MacKichan to sell for the book value of $100.28 per
share, pursuant to the stockholders' agreement. 8 3 The trial court determined that MacKichan was required to sell for $100.28 per share, and
MacKichan appealed. 84 On appeal, through the use of asset value and
earning value methods, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined
that the use of the $100.28 per share, or book value, was the fairest way
to value MacKichan's minority stock.S5 The court followed this approach again in 1990, when it found that the use of an adjusted book
value represented a fair price without the use of a minority discount.8 6
Despite the use of book value figures, the most recent valuation
approach prior to Gene and Sheila Fisher's case did apply a minority
discount.8 7 In Kaiser v. Kaiser,88 the court upheld an 11.3 percent discount on Mrs. Kaiser's minority stock.89 Lillian and Marvin Kaiser were
married and had interests in a closely held corporation and one other
business that needed to be split during a divorce. 90 Lillian Kaiser desired
a minority discount of between twenty-five and forty percent on her
stock valuation, so that the cash coming to her in the equitable distribution might be greater. 9 1 However, the court noted that she was afforded
protection under the Business Corporation Act, which would help to
insure an equitable division under the divorce, and therefore an 11.3
percent discount was found to be sufficient. 92 Thus, the court relied on
82. See id. at 182. MacKichan had offered to sell his 916 shares of stock, according to the
stockholders' agreement, at $100.28 per share. Id. Pursuant to the agreement, the stock was offered
to both the corporation and individual stockholders, all of whom rejected the original offer. Id. Then,
before the agreement period ended, KBM made an attempt to purchase the stock, which MacKichan
refused. Id.
83. Id. MacKichan counterclaimed, seeking liquidation of the corporation and distribution of
assets to the shareholders. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 183-84 (determining that the net asset method without discount was the best approach;
finding a fair value at the time of $73.45; and since this was less than the agreed book value, awarding
$100.28 per share).
86. See Davis v. Davis, 458 N.W.2d 309, 315 (N.D. 1990). However, the court will not accept
an unadjusted book value. See Wald v. Wald, 556 N.W.2d 291, 295 (1996) (deciding to apply a
buy-out situation in which Mr. Wald had to pay off Mrs. Wald's share of their stock).
87. See Kaiser v. Kaiser, 555 N.W.2d 585, 588 (N.D. 1996).
88. 555 N.W.2d 585 (N.D. 1996).
89. See Kaiser v. Kaiser, 555 N.W.2d 585, 588 (N.D. 1996).
90. See id. at 586.
91. See id. at 588. Note that this seems to be the same type of formula Sheila Fisher used to
increase the cash payment she would receive by requesting that the court apply a discount to her
shares. Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 18, 568 N.W.2d 728, 731. Normally, it would be the
majority stockholder seeking a discount of the minority shares.
92. See Kaiser, 555 N.W.2d at 588 (finding that the argued discount had been too severe and
stating that the court's reduction of the discount was not clearly erroneous, without making an express
determination that a minority discount should be applied in a divorce action).
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the Business Corporation Act as sufficient to protect the minority
93
shareholder's interest.
2.

North Dakota's Business CorporationAct; Alternatives to
Judicial Dissolution.

A minority shareholder who has been frozen out may have recourse
against the majority shareholder under North Dakota's revised Business
Corporation Act. 94 The primary recourse for a shareholder dealing with
a freeze-out is the involuntary dissolution provision provided for as part
of the Business Corporation Act. 95
Involuntary dissolution is the process by which a court forces a
corporation to dissolve and liquidate its assets. 96 The proceeds of the
liquidation are then distributed to the shareholders pro rata, and the
corporation is thus ended. 97 Involuntary dissolution is considered an
extreme remedy, and therefore the North Dakota statute also allows
courts to grant any equitable relief they deem just and reasonable under
the circumstances of a particular case. 98 To do this, a court can look to
the duty the shareholders owed to each other and the reasonable expectations of the shareholders both at inception of the corporation and as
the corporation developed. 99 By looking at these factors, a court could
determine the fair value of stock by using whichever valuation method it
desired, employing whichever factors of the case it deemed relevant.1 0 0
93. Id.
94. See Business Corporations Act of Apr. 4, 1985, ch. 147, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 332 (codified
at N.D. CENr CODE §§ 10-19.1-01 to -131 (1985 & Supp. 1997)).
95. N.D. CENT CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1985 & Supp. 1997). Section 10-19.1-115(1)(b)(3) provides,
for purposes related to Gene and Sheila Fisher's case, that:
(1) A court may grant any equitable relief it deems just and reasonable in the
circumstance or may dissolve a corporation and liquidate its assets and business:
(b) In an action by a shareholder when it is established that:
(3) The directors or those in control of the corporation have acted in a manner unfairly
prejudicial toward one or more shareholders in their capacities as shareholders or
directors of a corporation that is not a publicly held corporation or as officers or
employees of a closely held corporation.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(1)(b)(3) (1985 & Supp. 1997).
96. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1985 & Supp. 1997).
97. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(1) (1985 & Supp. 1997).
98. Id.
99. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(4) (1985 & Supp. 1997). This section provides in part:
In determining whether to order equitable relief or dissolution, the court shall take into
consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one
another to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner . . . and the reasonable
expectations of the shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop during the
course of the.. . relationship with the corporation and with each other.
Id.
100. See N.D. CENT CODE § 10-19.1-88(10) (1985). The dissenters' right statute provides that
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DISENTANGLEMENT OF A CLOSE CORPORATION HELD BY SPOUSES
PARTY TO A DIVORCE

When a divorcing couple owns a business and cannot agree on how
to handle their business relationship, the court must determine distribution of the business so that the couple is not forced to remain connected
in a business atmosphere, which would make for an intolerable situation.10 1 There is little case law in North Dakota dealing directly with
court distribution of a divorcing couple's closely held stock, making it
helpful to look outside North Dakota for several examples of how courts
address this problem. 102
For example, in Robbins v. Robbinsl 0 3 a Florida court granted Mrs.
Robbins an undivided one-half interest in the couple's amusement park
corporation's closely held stock.l 0 4 The Florida District Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the failure of the trial court to grant Mrs.
Robbins the value of the stock was a denial of her ability to benefit from
06
"full and complete" equitable distribution.1 0 5 In Argyle v. Argyle,1
the Utah Supreme Court similarly upheld a cash award over a stock
division of closely held corporation stock.l0 7
The North Dakota Supreme Court has followed a similar pattern of
reasoning in relation to business interests generally, and in 1996 it noted
that in making a division of the marital estate it would "seek to disentangle the parties' financial affairs." 108 In Heggen v. Heggen, 109 the court
found that when a cash payment was awarded, the term for payment
should be for as little time as possible, which would help serve to disentangle the parties.llO In this case, John Heggen was drawing a salary
from Heggen Equipment, Inc.; his cash payments had been drawn out
over many years and would not conclude for a period of twenty-five
once the dissenting shareholder has petitioned the court to determine the fair value of the stock, the
court can then determine a fair value of the stock in question by "any and all factors the court finds
relevant, computed by any method or combination of methods." Id.
101. See Robbins v. Robbins, 549 So. 2d 1033, 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); see also Argyle v.
Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1984) (stating that leaving a divorced couple in a business
relationship has the effect of adding further tension, friction, and the possibility of further litigation).
102. See Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 10, 568 N.W.2d 728, 730 (discussing other states'
case law as to the distribution of closely held stock).
103. 549 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
104. See Robbins v. Robbins, 549 So. 2d 1033, 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
105. Id. at 1034. The Robbins court considered the fact that Mr. Robbins would not be able to
make the lump payment at one time, and it was therefore willing to consider alternatives such as
.installment payments or sale of the stock to achieve complete equitable division. Id.
106. 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984).
107. See Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1984).
108. See Heggen v. Heggen, 541 N.W.2d 463, 465 (N.D. 1996) (quoting from 27B C.J.S.
Divorce § 30, at 540 (1986)).
109. 541 N.W.2d 463 (N.D. 1996).
110. See Heggen v. Heggen, 541 N.W.2d 463, 465 (N.D. 1996) (citing Hanson v. Hanson, 672
S.W.2d 274, 279 (Tex. App. 1984)).
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years."I' The court decided that it needed to disentangle the parties, and
it thus reduced the amount of time John Heggen had to pay the divorce
judgment. 112
The North Dakota Supreme Court has also determined that when
there is sufficient animosity between the parties, and one party has made
a request that the couple's property be divided, the trial court should
grant this request and completely disentangle the couple. 113 While
divorce distribution need not be completely separate in every instance,
the court in Volk v. Vok114 noted that when there exists ill will between
the parties and a party maintains a desire to be completely disentangled,
the trial court should seek to achieve this result.1 1 5
III. CASE ANALYSIS
In Fisher v. Fisher,116 an opinion written by Justice Meschke, the
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the premarital property credit
and the trial court's valuation of Sheila's minority stock without applying a discount."l 7 However, the court reversed and remanded to the lower court for reconsideration of the split of stock that would have left the
couple in joint ownership of Fisher Industries.11 8 Justice Sandstrom concurred with the premarital property credit and the determination to value
the stock without a discount, but he dissented from the theory of disentanglement and the directions to be followed on remand of the case.1 19
111.

id. 464-65.
112. Id. at 465.
113. See Volk v. Volk, 404 N.W.2d 495, 499 (N.D. 1987) (relying on the previous decision of
Graves v. Graves, 340 N.W.2d 903 (N.D. 1983)).
114. 404 N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1987).
115. See Volk v. Volk, 404 N.W.2d 495, 499 (N.D. 1987). The North Dakota Supreme Court has
continued to use the disentanglement principle in relation to farm business ownership as well, making
disentanglement a principle the court will strive to use in divorce situations. Linrud v. Linrud, 552
N.W.2d 342, 346 (N.D. 1996). In Linrud, the court wrote that it would refuse to keep the farm as an
economic unit if it would pose potential economic hardship for one of the spouses party to a divorce.
Id. The court found that this situation would create a windfall, and it relied on Heley v. Heley for the
continued proposition that disentanglement was the appropriate means by which to accomplish an
equitable distribution of marital assets. See id. (citing Heley v. Heley, 506 N.W.2d 715, 718 (N.D.
1993)).
116. 1997 N.D. 176, 568 N.W.2d 728.
117. Fisher v. Fisher, 1997 N.D. 176, 36, 568 N.W.2d 728, 735.
118. Id.
119. See id. 38 (Sandstrom, J., concurring and dissenting).
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CREDIT FOR PREMARITAL ASSETS

Sheila first sought review of the trial court determination that Gene
was entitled to a $500,000 premarital property credit.120 The court
determined that the premarital property credit was not clearly erroneous,
based on the fact that the credit came to only two percent of the $23
million estate. 12 1 The court determined that the trial court had reasonably explained the credit and that it did not affect the overall division of
22
the property.1

The court also concluded that in making an equal division of
property all assets must be included in the marital estate, but that once
included, however, the origin of the property could be examined to
determine the proper division.1 23 If there is a major disparity in the
division of the property, the court noted that there must be an explanation for the substantial disparity.1 2 4 Using as an example the case of
VanOosting v. VanOosting, 125 in which the court upheld a property
credit for gifts from a parent to a child resulting in a twenty-five percent
distribution of gifts to one spouse, the Fisher court determined that
Gene's credit was relatively modest. 126 The court reasoned that this
credit resulted in an effective distribution in which Sheila received
around thirty-five percent of the premarital assets. 127
The court also addressed Sheila's argument that the premarital
property valuation was incorrect. 128 Sheila argued that a valuation of
premarital assets was speculative because valuing thirty-year-old property would require an analysis of economic influences and inflation on
1968 dollars. 129 The court did not accept this argument and determined
that the evidence was sufficient to justify the $500,000 credit. 130
B. DISCOUNTING MINORITY STOCK
Sheila also contested the trial court's split of Fisher Industries stock,
asserting that she only had two alternatives: sell her stock to the corpora120. Id. 1 14, 568 N.W.2d at 730.
121. Id. 116, 568 N.W.2d at 731.
122. Id.
123. See id. 1 15 (citing Gaulrapp v. Gualrapp, 510 N.W.2d 620, 621 (N.D. 1994)).
124. See id. (citing VanOosting v. VanOosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 96 (N.D. 1994); Heley v. Heley,
506 N.W.2d 715, 718 (N.D. 1993)).
125. 521 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1994).
126. Fisher, 1 15, 568 N.W.2d at 731.
127. Id.
128. Id. 17.
129. Id.
130. See id. (relying on Wald v. Wald, 556 N.W.2d 291, 295 (N.D. 1996) for the premise that
property valued within the range of the evidence will not be considered clearly erroneous).
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tion or a third party or petition the court for involuntary dissolution. 131
Sheila contended in connection with this argument that neither alternative was adequate to compensate her justly for her interest in the
corporation.1 32 Instead, she claimed that the trial court should have
applied a minority discount to the stock it was willing to allocate to her
to reflect its real value, and then it should have increased the cash
payment due from Gene to equalize the discount by returning them to
33
the prior equilibrium in the distribution of their property.1
The court declined to do so. 134 While recognizing that a buyer is
less willing to purchase a minority interest in a corporation than a
majority interest, and thus that Sheila might be correct that her stock
would be worth less to a buyer, the court nevertheless determined that
Sheila was not correct in her statement that the value of her shares would
be discounted upon dissolution. 13 5 Rather, the court determined that the
North Dakota Business Corporation Act would give Sheila significant
protection in relation to her minority shareholder position.136
Under the Business Corporation Act, North Dakota Century Code
section 10-19.1-115(1)(b)(3), Sheila or any mistreated shareholder of a
closely held corporation is able to obtain corporate involuntary
dissolution. 137 The court also recognized that, should she petition for
such relief, the court to which she brought the matter would be required
to consider alternatives to dissolution. 13 8 For example, the court could
force the majority shareholder or shareholders to purchase the minority
131. See id. 1 18 (citing Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 797 (N.D. 1991) (giving
examples of oppressive conduct that would be adequate to enforce the corporate remedy of
involuntary dissolution, such as refusal to declare dividends, large salaries and bonuses to majority,
and high rent payments for leased property)).
132. See id. Sheila asserted that selling her stock would not work because a purchaser would not
want to pay for a non-controlling interest in the corporation. Id. She also asserted that dissolution
would have the effect of discounting her shares in the corporation. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. The court noted that if a minority discount was appropriate in this situation, it could not
fault the trial court for not applying the discount. Id. 18 n.I. The court stated that Sheila had submitted no evidence to allow for a discount, and the court was unwilling to take up new arguments not
made to the trial court. See id.
135. Id. 1 18 (citing Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987)). The court
recognized that controlling stock is by nature more valuable than non-controlling stock because a
buyer will pay more to be able to influence the affairs of the corporation. Id. (citing 18A AM. JUR. 2d
Corporations § 795 (1985)). In its discussion of this issue, the court referred to Gene and Sheila
Fisher's children's case, in which the court noted that the "valuation of minority shares in a close
corporation ... is problematic at best." Id. 1 20 (quoting Fisher v. Fisher, 546 N.W.2d 354, 357 (N.D.
1996)).
136. Id.
137. Id., 568 N.W.2d at 732. The cited section of the Century Code deals with the standard for
determining unfairly prejudicial conduct of the majority towards the minority shareholder. Id. Fisher
Industries qualified as a closely held corporation under North Dakota's definition of a closely held
corporation because it had fewer than 35 stockholders. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-01(7) (1985
& Supp. 1997).
138. Fisher, 20, 568 N.W.2d at 732.
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shareholder's stock for "fair value" if it determined such a result to be
139
"fair and equitable" to all concerned under the circumstances.
Further, if the court does determine the fair value of the stock, it has the
option of using any method or combination of methods for valuation
that it sees fit.140
In reviewing the North Dakota history on the minority discount, the
court looked to the case of Kaiser, which upheld an 11.3 percent discount in a family-held corporation involved in a divorce action. 141
However, the court countered the application of this type of discount by
looking to the case of Brown, in which the court had previously discussed and applied a fixed and undiscounted fair value to minority
stock.1 42 The court also affirmed a fair value determination without a
14 3
discount for the minority shareholder in KBM, Inc. v. MacKichan,
and therefore the court held that this type of valuation could be fairly
applied in Fisher.144
This application of the fair value standard is in agreement with
almost all other jurisdictions, most of which have refused to require a
minority discount.1 4 5 The Fisher court looked at the fact that other
courts have recognized the diminished value of a minority interest, but it
found this irrelevant when it is the corporation or its shareholders that
will be purchasing this interest.14 6 The court noted that since the purpose of the corporate remedy statutes is the protection of the minority
shareholder interest, especially in the closely held corporation, no
minority shareholder discount should be needed.14 7 When courts fix the
139. Id. (citing N.D. CENr CODE § 10-19.1-115(3)(a) (1985 & Supp. 1997)). The court also noted
that if the parties could not agree upon fair value, the court would have the option of determining fair
value under section 10-19.1-88(10) of the North Dakota Century Code. Fisher 20, 568 N.W.2d at
732.
140. Fisher,

20, 568 N.W.2d at 732 (citing N.D. CENT CODE § 10-19.1-88(10) (1985 & Supp.

1997)).
141. See id. 21 (citing Kaiser v. Kaiser, 555 N.W.2d 585, 588 (N.D. 1996)). The contention in
the Kaiser appeal, however, was only that the discount of the stock should have been greater, not that
there should be no discount. Kaiser, 555 N.W.2d at 588. The Kaiser court refused to order a greater
discount. Id.
142. See Fisher, 21, 568 N.W.2d at 732 (citing Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d
249, 258 (N.D. 1971)).
143. 438 N.W.2d 181 (N.D. 1989).
144. Fisher, 21, 23, 568 N.W.2d at 732.
145. Fisher, 22 (citing Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Proprietyof Applying Minority Discount
to Value of Shares Purchased by Corporation or its Shareholders from Minority Shareholders, 13
A.L.R.5th 840, 850 (1993)).
146. Id. (citing Charland v. Country View Golf Club, Inc., 588 A.2d 609, 611-12 (R.I. 1991)).
147. See id. 22-23 (citing Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., Inc., 154 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176
(Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (explaining that a minority shareholder should not receive less through a buy-out
remedy than under a dissolution proceeding); MT Properties, Inc. v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 481
N.W.2d 383, 388 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (determining that the legislature's adoption of a statute
protecting minority shareholders required that the court refrain from applying a minority discount
when determining fair value); Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349 (N.Y. App. Div.
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fair value, it is not uncommon to disallow a minority discount of that
stock.' 4 8 The court concluded by agreeing with the Delaware Supreme
Court's opinion in Cavalier Oil Corporation v. Harnett,149 in which the
court determined that a stock discount adds into the valuation process
speculation on factors that affect marketability of minority shares and
thus fails to give minority shareholders the proportionate value of their
50
stock.1
Upon review of the treatment of the minority discount, here and
elsewhere, the Fisher court concluded that when determining fair value
under the North Dakota Business Corporation Act, a court need not
automatically apply a discount.151 In the case before it, in which Gene
and Sheila had already set the value of their stock at $9,094 per share
through an agreement, albeit for a different purpose in this case, the
court would not apply a minority discount to effect an increase in the
marital division cash payment to Sheila.152 Stating that Sheila's corporate remedies were adequate, the court noted that on remand the trial
court should implement the corporate remedy concurrently with the
divorce to avoid an excess of litigation. 153
C.

DISENTANGLEMENT

The final issue the court addressed in this case dealt with disentangling the Fishers' interests to allow a complete separation of the
parties. 15 4 The court determined that a marital property distribution is a
finding of fact and will not be changed unless it is determined that the
original distribution was clearly erroneous.15 5 The standard for a distribution of property in a North Dakota divorce case is to make an equitable division of the marital assets. 156 In this case, the court stated that it
was "definitely and firmly convinced that it was a mistake to keep these
former spouses together in a business relationship that will inevitably
1985) (finding the fact that the valued interest represented a minority did not, by itself, justify a
discount)).
148. See id. 23 (citing In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997,
1003 (Me. 1989); Columbia Management Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207, 213-14 (Or. 1988)).
149. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
150. See Fisher, 23, 568 N.W.2d at 732 (citing Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137,
1145 (Del. 1989) (concluding that imposing a discount penalizes the minority shareholder for his or
her lack of control, which allows the majority to "reap a windfall" when buying out the minority
shareholder)).
151. Id.
152. See id., 568 N.W.2d at 732-33.
153. Id. 1 24-25, 568 N.W.2d at 733. On a final note, the court made it clear that if the couple
could not get along in their personal relationship, it was inappropriate for the trial court to think that
they could get along in a business relationship. Id.
154. Id. 126.
155. Id. 1 27 (citing Linrud v. Linrud, 552 N.W.2d 342, 345 (N.D. 1996) (explaining the standard
to mean that the court must have "a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made");
Heley v. Heley, 506 N.W.2d 715, 718 (N.D. 1993)) (stating the clearly erroneous standard).
156. Id. (citing N.D. CENT.CODE § 14-05-24 (1997)).
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lead to more litigation."1 5 7 Therefore, it was necessary to determine a
method for splitting the Fisher Industries stock.158
The trial court had noted that Gene and Sheila Fisher exhibited
"substantial hostility" toward one another, and the court had earlier
159
appointed a receiver to protect the couple's Fisher Industries stock.
The receiver had noted in a report to the court that the biggest problem
Fisher Industries faced was the conflict between Gene and Sheila. 160 The
receiver's conclusions were that Gene's and Sheila's ideas were incompatible and that they would not be able to work together as co-owners of
Fisher Industries. 16 1 The court also noted that, according to the docket
sheets in the case, the couple's quarrelsome behavior had caused them to
file 500 separate items before the trial, which lasted twelve days and
included more than 350 exhibits, and the court concluded that the
bitterness of this conflict clearly called for a complete disentanglement
of the parties.162
The court noted that other courts have avoided splitting stock
between divorcing parties who exhibit hostile characteristics toward one
another. 163 The court also looked to Robbins, in which a Florida court
stated that leaving a couple in a financial relationship in which one is a
minority shareholder places that spouse without any real control and at a
disadvantage in the corporation.1 64 The court also pointed to a Utah
Supreme Court case in which the court determined that, wherever possible, a division of stock will be avoided, because forcing the couple to
remain in the relationship as business partners risked further friction.165
The court determined that North Dakota also prefers the type of
marital distribution that will completely disentangle the parties' financial
affairs.166 One of the spouses can thus operate the business without conflict between the two.167 The Fisher court affirmed that when a couple
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. 28. The receiver was appointed in November of 1995, despite the objection of Sheila
and three of her children. Id. Their objections were resolved in the earlier Fisher v. Fisher decision,
in which the court stated that the children could not intervene in the divorce action. Id. 29 (citing
Fisher v. Fisher, 546 N.W.2d 354, 355 (N.D. 1996)). The argument made on behalf of the children
was that their interest would be diminished by the appointment of a receiver. Id.
160. Id. 30. The receiver determined that both Gene and Sheila wanted to control the
corporation, both had very different management styles, and neither had a desire to share the power
base as they had in the past. Id.
161. Id., 568 N.W.2d at 733-34.
162. Id. 1 31, 568 N.W.2d at 734.
163. Id. 1 32 (citing Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Divorce: Propriety of Property Distribution
Leaving Both Parties with SubstantialOwnership Interest in Same Business, 56 A.L.R.4th 862 (1987)).
164. Id. (citing Robbins v. Robbins, 549 So. 2d 1033, 1033-34 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1989)).
165. Id. (citing Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1984)).
166. Id. 1 33 (quoting Heggen v. Heggen, 541 N.W.2d 463, 465 (N.D. 1996)).
167. Id. (citing Linrud v. Linnmd, 552 N.W.2d 342, 346 (N.D. 1996); Heley v. Heley, 506 N.W.2d
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specifically requests that their relationship be completely divided and
there is conflict between the parties which cannot be resolved, the trial
court should effect a total separation. 168 The court concluded by stating
that Gene and Sheila had demonstrated that they could not work to169
gether, and therefore disentanglement was preferred in their situation.
D.

REMAND

The primary issue on remand will be to reconsider the split of stock
ownership between Gene and Sheila, the possibilities for redistributing
the estate including either a buy-out by one spouse, or one or more spinoffs, split-offs, or split-ups severing the subsidiaries of Fisher Industries
and allocating each severed to one party or the other.170 Doing this split
will require the lower court to take into consideration the tax consequences of the corporate separations, and to make any adjustments necessary to equitably divide the property.171 The supreme court noted that if
the trial court ordered a buy-out involving deferred payments, the payments should be secured and structured to insure that the seller receives
payment in as little time as possible. 172 In conclusion, the court suggested that the trial court use the buy-out method, if possible, to effect an
equal division, or if the trial court cannot find any appropriate manner
of disentangling the parties, the court should make findings to support
73
the other disposition ordered.1
E.

CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT

Justice Sandstrom both concurred in and dissented from the majority opinion.17 4 Justice Sandstrom's main contention was that the majority
professed, as required by the "clearly erroneous" standard, to be firmly
convinced that a mistake occurred by keeping the parties together, but
then went on to only suggest that the trial court reconsider its stock
split.175 He elucidated the point by quoting the majority's conclusion

715, 718 (N.D. 1993); Martin v. Martin, 450 N.W.2d 768, 769-70 (N.D. 1990); Linn v. Linn, 370
N.W.2d 536, 543 (N.D. 1985); Graves v. Graves, 340 N.W.2d 903, 907 (N.D. 1983)).
168. Id. (citing Volk v. Volk, 404 N.W.2d 495, 499 (N.D. 1987)).
169. Id. 134.
170. See id. 35 (suggesting that it might be possible to split the General Steel subsidiary or the
Green Acres subsidiary from Fisher Industries). The court had a difficult time expounding precisely
how the stock split should occur, as shown by the lengthy paragraph on options available to the trial
court without any clear indication as to the desired means to achieve this split. Id.
171. Id. 1 35, 568 N.W.2d at 734-35 (noting that there might be tax consequences if the court
decided to split off a subsidiary, gauging the consequences of which would require expert testimony).
This type of problem is not new to the court which had noted in Kaiser that the trial court should consider tax consequences when valuing the marital estate. See id. (citing Kaiser v. Kaiser, 474 N.W.2d
63, 69-70 (N.D. 1991)).
172. See id. (citing Heggen v. Heggen, 541 N.W.2d 463, 465 (N.D. 1996)).
173. See id. 1 36, 568 N.W.2d at 735.
174. Id. 38 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
175. Id. 39.
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that "if' disentanglement can be accomplished, then it should be. 17 6 In
his view, a "nagging concern" that an error may have occurred is not a
"definite and firm" conviction that a mistake has been made, and thus it
is not enough to justify a reversal.1 77 Justice Sandstrom pointed to this
lack of internal coherence on the part of the majority, but he did not
suggest how or if the court should have split the stock.178 He would have
affirmed the lower court's decision, which would have had the effect of
leaving the parties in joint ownership of Fisher Industries with Sheila in
the minority.1 79
IV. IMPACT
The majority's principal point seems to be that splitting the
couple's stock would only condemn the parties, and the courts, to inevitable further litigation, in which Gene will be ordered to buy out Sheila,
and that this is something that may as well be accomplished now if possible. 180 Thus, the Fishercourt left the lower court with the task of determining whether to order a buy-out, determine the best split distribution,
or leave its original stock split intact. 18 1 The immediate impact of this
decision is then that the lower court must undertake substantial efforts in
previously unopened issues, and, if none of those considerations point
the right way, re-enter its prior distribution with findings establishing that
none of the alternatives was either feasible or prudent. 182
The decision in Fisher has, however, reaffirmed several principles of
North Dakota divorce law, such as the credit for premarital property and
the court's goal of trying to disentangle a couple's relationship as much
as possible upon dissolution of the marriage.18 3 In these situations, the
Fisher court has not departed from earlier cases, and on the issue of
disentanglement, it has synthesized North Dakota's case law. 184
It is on the issue of minority discount and valuation of stock that the
Fisher case will most likely have the most confusing impact.1 85 The
Fisher opinion seems to undercut Kaiser, in which a discount was approved, albeit in a case in which none of the parties was arguing that
there should have been no discount. Contrarily, Fisher may suggest that
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. U 32-33, 568 N.W.2d at 734.
181. Id. 1 36, 568 N.W.2d at 735.
182. Id.
183. Id. 1 15, 33, 568 N.W.2d at 731, 734.
184. See id. 1 33, 568 N.W.2d at 734 (giving North Dakota's background on the disentanglement
principle and affirming its use in this case).
185. Id. 24, 568 N.W.2d at 733.
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in a divorce situation there may be no need to enforce a minority
discount.1 86 However, Fisher does not clearly delineate the circumstances in which a minority discount might or should be applied.1 87
18
Tracy A. Fischer

8

186. Id.; see Kaiser v. Kaiser, 555 N.W.2d 585, 588 (N.D. 1996) (applying a minority discount in
a divorce action).
187. See Fisher, 18, 568 N.W.2d at 731 (determining that although it will not apply a minority
discount, the court in footnote one wavers by suggesting that a minority discount may still be applicable
in a divorce action).
188. The author wishes to extend special thanks to Professor Randy Lee and Delvin Losing for
their helpful input into the writing and editing of this article.

